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INTRODUCTION
The law distinguishes between an undocumented alien worker’s
right to economic damages stemming from termination of his unlawful
employment and his right to certain non-economic damages incurred
during such prohibited activities—particularly compensation for injuries
suffered during the course of unlawful employment. Under the federal
1
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), economic damages,
such as back or front pay, are unavailable to aliens unlawfully present in
the United States who procured their employment in violation of the
2
IRCA. On the federal level, these individuals do not have authorization
to work and consequently have no lawful entitlement to unemployment
or wage benefits. However, New Jersey permits undocumented alien
workers to recover non-economic damages under its statewide Workers’
Compensation scheme, despite the fact that such individuals are not
3
authorized to work in the United States.
Although the Supreme Court held that undocumented alien
4
workers are not entitled to back pay when they experience wrongful
termination under the federal National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)

1
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (ICRA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c
(2013).
2
Davila v. Grimes, No. 2:09-CV-407, 2010 WL 1737121, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29,
2010) (declining to decide on motion to compel, but determining that immigration status is
relevant to claim for lost wages in tort action).
3
Many state courts, including those in New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and, most recently, in Delaware and the District of Columbia, have found that
the IRCA does not preempt state law on lost wages in workers’ compensation cases. See,
e.g., Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 632–33 (D.C. 2010).
4
The term “unlawfully present alien” is considered by some to be synonymous with
“illegal alien,” though the latter has a more pejorative ring and is therefore not being
employed herein. For purposes of this article, it may be more accurate to describe the group
as “non-citizens unauthorized to work,” though this phrase is a bit too unwieldy to include
throughout.
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because of their lack of work authorization in the first instance,
undocumented workers in the state of New Jersey maintain access to the
statewide Workers’ Compensation scheme if they suffer from workrelated injuries. Unlike the NLRA, which creates independent causes of
action for those employees falling under its umbrella, New Jersey
Workers’ Compensation is a statutory scheme utilized in part as a
substitute for civil lawsuits to which everyone would traditionally have
5
access regardless of immigration status. Thus, undocumented alien
workers have access to workers’ compensation benefits just as they
would have access to civil remedies in courts of law. Although New
Jersey grants undocumented alien workers access to Workers’
Compensation Courts despite their lack of authority to work in the
United States, the state does not extend economic remuneration, such as
unemployment benefits, to these workers. This Article explains the
unlawfully present alien’s access to New Jersey’s Workers’
Compensation Courts—and not economic programs, such as
unemployment benefits—and the basis for allowing an unlawfully
present alien to pursue certain work-related injury claims under New
6
Jersey Law.
I.

Background on the Immigration Reform and Control Act

7

8

Immigration law falls exclusively within the federal domain. The
authority to admit or exclude non-citizens from the United States is a
9
fundamentally sovereign act. The statutory and regulatory schemes
governing immigration law are found at the federal level. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act is a “comprehensive scheme
5

Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996).
6
The issue of temporary disability compensation and undocumented alien workers is
not addressed in this Article, but it is important to note that such benefits are an additional
way for undocumented alien workers to seek compensation from employers. The extent of
undocumented alien workers’ access to such benefits is beyond the scope of this piece.
Anecdotally, it appears that many undocumented alien workers would have trouble
accessing such benefits due to the fact that it is common for them to be paid in cash, and
proof of wages is one essential element of temporary disability compensation claims.
7
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c (2006).
8
C.f. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (“Nor can federal power over illegal immigration be deemed
exclusive because of what the Court’s opinion solicitously calls ‘foreign countries[’]
concern[s] about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States.”).
9
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
705 (1893); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
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10

prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”
The IRCA “forcefully” made combating the employment of
11
unlawfully present aliens central to “[t]he policy of immigration law.”
12
It did so by establishing an extensive employment verification system
designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present
in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the
13
United States. This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime.
To enforce it, the IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and
eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before
14
they begin work. If an alien applicant is unable to present the required
15
documentation, he cannot be hired. Furthermore, it is a crime under the
IRCA for an alien to undermine the employer verification system by
using or attempting to use “any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely
made document” or “any document lawfully issued to or with respect to
a person other than the possessor” for purposes of obtaining
16
employment in the United States. Violation of the IRCA can result in
17
fines, incarceration, or both for the alien offender. Similarly,
employers may be subject to significant civil money penalties and even
18
criminal sanctions for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.
Employers that unknowingly hire an unauthorized alien, or later
discover that the alien has lost his lawful status during employment,
19
must immediately discharge that employee.

10

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 147
(2002) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari on other
cases on this issue. Cont’l Pet Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 546 U.S. 825 (2005); Vaughan
Roofing & Sheet Metal, LLC v. Rodriguez, 131 S. Ct. 1572 (2011).
11
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502
U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991).
12
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2006).
13
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)(2006).
14
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(2006).
15
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(2006).
16
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324c(a)(1)–(3)(2006).
17
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2013).
18
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e)(5), 1324a(f)(1)(2006).
19
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2)(2006).
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The Supreme Court on Economic Remedies to
Undocumented Alien Workers Based on Labor Law
Violations: Hoffman Plastic Compounds

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board is the most recent U.S. Supreme Court case to address the rights
of undocumented workers pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act
20
in light of the broad restrictions of the IRCA. The case arose in the
context of an action contesting an order of the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter “Board”) awarding back pay to an undocumented
21
worker in response to his improper termination under the NLRA.
Castro, the undocumented alien worker, originally secured employment
22
via the use of fraudulent documents, a criminal act under the IRCA.
The offending employer fired Castro because he supported a union23
organizing effort, a violation of the NLRA. As a result of its violation
of the NLRA, Hoffman was ordered by the Board to award back pay to
Castro from the date of improper termination to the date Hoffman
24
learned of Castro’s undocumented status. The Hoffman Court stated
that it was being asked to permit an “award [of] backpay [sic] to an
illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not
lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by
25
a criminal fraud.” The Court ultimately held “that awarding backpay
[sic] to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies
26
the Board has no authority to enforce or administer.”
The Supreme Court further concluded that “allowing the Board to
award backpay [sic] to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit
statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as
expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of
27
the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.”
The IRCA and Hoffman were later relied upon by lower courts to
deny undocumented workers the right to seek alternative remedies for
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 148–49, 159–60.
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 151.
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other employment-related wrongful conduct, such as workplace
28
discrimination. In Crespo v. Evergo Corp., the plaintiff, a former
employee and an undocumented alien worker, claimed that Evergo
29
refused to permit her to return to work after going on maternity leave.
The New Jersey Appellate Division held that an undocumented alien
who gained employment using fraudulent documentation was
disqualified from legal employment and thus is ineligible for economic
or non-economic recovery (i.e., back pay and reinstatement to her
former position, respectively) under the New Jersey Law Against
30
Discrimination (“LAD”). The court made clear that Crespo’s claims
arose solely from her wrongful termination and not from any
31
mistreatment during the course of her employment. In reconciling the
facial disconnect between the IRCA and the LAD, the court noted that,
although the LAD provides that all persons have the right to be
employed without fear of discrimination, the LAD also allows an
employer to “‘restrict employment to citizens of the United States
32
where such restriction is required by federal law. . . .’”
While Hoffman and Crespo deny undocumented workers the right
to recover economic and non-economic damages under the LAD and
the NLRA, these cases do not leave workers without any state and
federal workplace rights, including the right to receive workers’
compensation benefits after suffering a job-related injury or illness.
III.

An Undocumented Worker’s Right to Personal Injury
Damages

“Each person is entitled to the equal protection of the law” and
“every alien, whether in this country legally or not, has a right to sue
33
those who physically injure him.” The principal goal of damages in
34
personal-injury actions is to compensate fairly the injured party. Fair
28

Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 472.
30
Id. at 477; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–1.
31
Crespo, 841 A.2d at 477.
32
Id. at 474 (quoting § 10:5–12(a) (West 2013)).
33
Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641–42 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886)).
34
Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 652 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1984).
29
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compensatory damages resulting from the tortious infliction of injury
encompass no more than the amount that will make the plaintiff whole,
35
that is, the actual loss. “The purpose, then [,] of personal injury
compensation is neither to reward the plaintiff, nor to punish the
36
defendant, but to replace plaintiff’s losses.”
New Jersey case law regarding the universal right to access the
courts for civil remedies generally provides the key to understanding the
basis for granting workers’ compensation to undocumented alien
workers. New Jersey courts have long held “‘that illegal aliens have
rights of access to the courts and are eligible to sue therein to enforce
contracts and redress civil wrongs such as negligently inflicted personal
37
injuries.’” The New Jersey Appellate Division has held that “a well
established body of law holds that illegal aliens have rights of access to
the courts and are eligible to sue therein to enforce contracts and redress
38
civil wrongs such as negligently inflicted personal injuries.” The New
Jersey Appellate Division reaffirmed this sentiment even after the 1996
39
IRCA immigration reforms. Other post-Hoffman courts have also
attempted to reconcile the IRCA with the availability of workers’
40
compensation and personal injury economic damages.
The highest federal court to address an instance of personal injury
of an undocumented alien worker is the Second Circuit Court of
41
Appeals in Madeira v. Affordable Housing Fund, Inc. That court heard
an appeal from a jury verdict in a personal injury action under New
York state law awarding compensatory damages for lost earnings to an
undocumented alien worker, as well as out-of-pocket expenses and pain
42
and suffering. Madeira distinguished the holding in Hoffman, noting
that “the injury being remedied in Hoffman Plastic was termination
while the wrong being compensated in this case is disabling personal

35
Ruff v. Weintraub, 519 A.2d 1384, 1386 (N.J. 1987) (citing Tenore v. Nu Car
Carriers, 341 A.2d 613, 619 (N.J. 1975)).
36
See Domeracki, supra note 38.
37
Crespo, 841 A.2d at 476 (quoting Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102,
1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)).
38
Montoya, 401 A.2d at 103–04 (citations omitted).
39
Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225 (citing Montoya, 401 A.2d at 103–04) (“We fully
subscribe to that proposition.”).
40
See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239 n. 21 (2d Cir.
2006).
41
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
42
Id.
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43

injury.” Generally, for public policy reasons, undocumented workers
who are injured on the job should be eligible to recover lost wages when
the employer is at fault. Where “(1) the wrong being compensated is
personal injury, conduct not authorized by IRCA; (2) it was the
employer and not the worker who [knowingly] violated IRCA by
arranging for the employment; and (3) the jury was instructed to
consider the worker’s removability in assessing damages,” New York
could, consistent with the IRCA, allow an injured worker to be
44
compensated with lost earnings at United States pay rates.
Following Madeira, the court in Hocza v. City of New York
determined lost wages were recoverable in a negligence claim, stating
“neither [Madeira nor Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC] held that a claim
for lost earnings by an undocumented alien should be treated differently
45
than such a claim ‘by any other injured person.’” The court in Hocza
concluded that a plaintiff’s immigration status could not be introduced
for the possibility that he would be deported, but it could be used to
address its “impact on opportunities for employment in the United
46
States.”
Although not precedential, it should be noted that, in 2011, the
47
U.S. District Court for New Jersey, in Kalyta v. Versa Products, an
unpublished case, held that an undocumented worker may seek damages
for lost wages in connection with a personal injury suit. Kalyta initially
entered the United States on a student visa but, instead of going to
school, he went to work at a satellite dish installation company where he
48
was injured after falling from a ladder while on the job. He sued the
ladder manufacturer and related sales entities for personal injuries and
49
lost wages due to his inability to work as a result of his injuries. Unlike
in Hoffman, this was not a suit by an employee against his employer,
and there were no allegations that Kalyta gained employment by use of
fraudulent documents. The court noted that Crespo had previously held
43

Id. at 236.
Id. at 223, 228.
45
Hocza v. City of New York, No. 06–3340, 2009 WL 124701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,
2009) (referencing Madiera, 469 F.3d 219 and Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d
1246 (N.Y. 2006).
46
Id.
47
Kalyta v. Versa Prods., No. 07-1333 (MLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27719 (D.N.J.
Mar. 17, 2011).
48
Id. at *2.
49
Id. at *3.
44
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that “where the governing workplace statutory scheme makes legal
employment a prerequisite to its remedial benefits, a worker’s illegal
50
alien status will bar relief thereunder.” The court also noted the
absence of any New Jersey authority creating such a prerequisite for the
recovery of lost wages in a personal injury action. Accordingly, the
court held that “neither IRCA nor New Jersey law prohibits lost wages
damages for undocumented workers in the personal injury tort
51
context.”
IV.

The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, Work Injury
Claims, and the “Intentional Wrong” Caveat

Workers’ Compensation is a state insurance program designed to
provide compensation to employees who suffer job-related injuries or
illness. In New Jersey, the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”)
provides that “[w]hen personal injury is caused to an employee by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which
the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural
and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor [sic] from
52
his employer. . . .” The WCA also provides that the parties’ use of the
statute
shall be a surrender by the [employer and employee] of their rights to
any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination
thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all of the
provisions of [the Workers’ Compensation Act], and shall bind the
53
employee. . . as well as the employer. . . .

There are three types of benefits to which workers are entitled
under New Jersey’s WCA: medical, temporary disability, and
54
permanent disability. Medical benefits compensate the worker for
55
expenses paid for medical treatment to treat or cure the injury. If an
injury produces a temporary disability, the worker is eligible to receive
seventy percent of his or her wages at the time of the injury, subject to a
50

Id. at *19 (quoting Crespo, 841 A.2d at 476).
Kalyta, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27719, at *20.
52
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15–1 (West 2013).
53
§ 34:15–8.
54
Many attorneys list an additional benefit: reopener rights. This is the ability to seek
additional benefits within two years of the last payment received if the worker’s injury
becomes worse than initially projected. This benefit is distinct from the others in that it is
not an immediate, monetary benefit resulting from an initial claim. § 34:15–27.
55
§ 34:15–15.
51
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certain statutory minimum and maximum, for up to 400 weeks. For a
permanent and total disability, a worker may receive seventy percent of
his or her wages at the time of the injury, subject to statutory
57
limitations, for 450 weeks. To receive benefits for longer than 450
58
weeks, the worker must demonstrate continued injury. For partial,
permanent disability, a worker is entitled to seventy percent of wages
for a period, to be paid in accordance with the Disability Wage and
59
Compensation Schedule embodied in the Act.
New Jersey case law further supports that the WCA creates an
exclusive remedy for employees who sustain injuries arising in and out
60
of the course of their employment. “It is the plain, unambiguous
language of the statute itself . . . which clearly demonstrates that
Workers’ Compensation is the exclusive remedy afforded to the
61
employee who is injured during the course of his employment.” The
WCA embodies “an [sic] historic ‘trade-off’ whereby employees
relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for
prompt and automatic entitlement to benefits for work-related
62
injuries.” “If an injury . . . is compensable under [the WCA], a person
shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of
63
such injury . . . except for intentional wrong.” Thus, even if an
undocumented worker recovers damages under the WCA scheme, he is
likely stuck with those benefits as the exclusive remedy. He may only
recover further in court if he can get beyond the statute’s exclusivity
provision and establish that the injury meets the high bar of being an
“intentional wrong.”
A plaintiff—any plaintiff, regardless of immigration status—
claiming such an “intentional wrong” bears a high burden of proof

56

§ 34:15–12(a).
§ 34:15–12(b).
58
Id.
59
§ 34:15–12(c).
60
Part of Title 34 Chapter 15 of the New Jersey statutes is the New Jersey Workers’
Compensation Act. §§ 34:15-1 to –142 (2012).
61
DeFigueiredo v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., 563 A.2d 76, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988), aff ’d, 563 A.2d 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
62
Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 886 (N.J. 2002) (citing Millison v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1985)); see also Seltzer v. Isaacson,
371 A.2d 304, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
63
§ 34:15–8 (emphasis added). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the nature of
“intentional wrong” in this context in Millison. Millison, 501 A.2d at 509–10.
57
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64

requiring a showing of a deliberate intent to injure. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Millison v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. held that,
in order to show intentional wrong on the part of the employer, the
plaintiff must show that there was both (1) conduct that amounts to
substantial certainty of harm, well beyond negligence or recklessness,
and (2) a context in which the injury or illness is “plainly beyond
anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the
employee to recover only under the [WCA],” excluding risks that are
65
inherent in the industrial industry. The court clarified that:
[e]ven if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence,
and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous
work condition to exist, knowingly ordering [a] claimant to perform
an extremely dangerous job, willfully failing to furnish a safe place
to work, or even willfully or unlawfully violating a safety statute,
this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs
66
the injury of accidental character.

Noting that the Workers’ Compensation system “confronts head-on the
unpleasant, even harsh, reality . . . that industry knowingly exposes
workers to the risks of injury and disease . . . . The essential question
[that must be answered is] what level of risk-exposure is so egregious as
67
to constitute an ‘intentional wrong.’”
Mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk does not constitute
intent. The New Jersey Appellate Division, in analyzing this issue,
concluded that “if the risk is great [,] the conduct may be characterized
68
as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong.” “[A]n
69
intentional wrong is not strictly a deliberate assault and battery.”

64
Millison, 501 A.2d at 510; see also Bryan v. Jeffers, 248 A.2d 129, 130 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1968) (“[T]he Legislature intended the words ‘intentional wrong,’ in this
context, to have their commonly understood signification of deliberate intention.”).
65
Millison, 501 A.2d at 514–15 (emphasis in original); see also Laidlow, 790 A.2d at
894 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 80, at 569
(5th ed. 1984) (emphasizing that “an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a
subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the
consequences of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm.”)).
66
Millison, 501 A.2d at 510 (quoting 6–103 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMAN’S COMPENSATION § 103.03, at 13–22 to 13–27 (1983)).
67
Millison, 501 A.2d at 513–14.
68
Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 823 A.2d 789, 795 (N.J. 2003) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Constr. Co., 823 A.2d 769, 772 (N.J. 2003) (citing
Millison, 501 A.2d at 513).
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Rather, the “substantial certainty” standard is determinative.
The quid pro quo of workers’ compensation “can best be preserved
by applying the ‘intent’ analysis of Dean Prosser to determine what is
an ‘intentional wrong’ within the meaning” of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1571
9. The meaning of intent is that an actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act or is substantially certain that such
72
consequences will result from his actions. The distinction between
negligence, recklessness, and intent is a matter of degree; “the dividing
line between negligent or reckless conduct on the one hand and
intentional wrong on the other must be drawn with caution, so that the
statutory framework of the Act is not circumvented simply because a
73
known risk later blossoms into reality.” There must be “a virtual
74
certainty.”
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Company, Inc. involved a serious
hand injury arising from the plaintiff’s use of an industrial rolling mill
75
at his place of employment. Thirteen years prior to the plaintiff’s
accident, his employer disabled a safety guard on the mill, replacing it
in its proper position only when Occupational Safety Health
76
Administration (“OSHA”) representatives visited the plant. Despite the
employer’s knowledge of the dangerous condition, the plaintiff’s prior
requests for reinstallation of the safety guard, and various “close calls”
resulting from the removal of the guard, the employer refused to
reinstall the guard, electing instead to forego the safety of its employees
77
in favor of increased “speed and convenience.” The Laidlow court
determined that a reasonable jury could find that, in light of such
circumstances, the defendant-employer “knew that it was substantially
certain that the removal of the safety guard would result eventually in

70

Millison, 501 A.2d at 514 (quoting Keeton et al., supra note 67, § 8, at 36) (Relying
upon The Law of Torts: “the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—something short
of substantial certainty—is not intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness
that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the
risk is great, the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an
intentional wrong.”).
71
Id.
72
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A.
73
Millison, 501 A.2d at 514.
74
Id. (citations omitted).
75
Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 887.
76
Id. at 888.
77
Id. at 897.
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78

injury to one of its employees.” The court made it clear that the
absence of a prior accident did not preclude a finding of an intentional
79
wrong. Thus, the court held that a jury question was presented as to the
80
conduct prong of the Millison test. With regard to the context prong,
the Laidlow court found that, “if an employee is injured when an
employer deliberately removes a safety device from a dangerous
machine to enhance profit or production, with substantial certainty that
it will result in death or injury to a worker, and also deliberately and
systematically deceives OSHA . . . such conduct violates the social
81
contract” and falls outside the scope of the workers’ compensation bar.
While ordinarily the same set of facts and circumstances will be
germane to both prongs, the conduct prong is a question of fact to be
determined by a jury, while the context prong is question of law for the
82
court.
V.

The Position of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation
Courts on Non-Economic Damages for Undocumented
Workers Injured on the Job versus Non-access to Certain
83
Economic Benefits

In the context of undocumented workers’ rights of access to courts
generally for civil remedies, New Jersey courts have interpreted
78

Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 897 (citing Cook v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 657 N.E.2d 356, 364
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995)).
80
Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 897–98.
81
Id. at 898. The Court was careful to circumscribe its ruling, however, noting that it
should not be understood to establish a per se rule that an “intentional wrong” is committed
whenever a safety device is removed from machinery or some other OSHA violation is
found. Id. Rather, what is necessary is the consideration of the “totality of the facts
contained in the record and the satisfaction of the standards established in Millison and
explicated here.” Id. See also Tomeo, 823 A.2d at 373, 384; Mull v. Zeta Computer Prods.,
823 A.2d 782, 786 (N.J. 2003); Crippen, 823 A.2d at 797–99.
82
Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 898.
83
In a related area of law, the New Jersey Department of Labor (“Department”) has
been unmistakable in making immigration status a non-issue in its enforcement of the New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”). The Department “[refuses to] investigate or
inquire into the legal status of any worker[;] applies New Jersey’s labor laws without regard
to a worker’s legal status; [and] does not share information with ‘Immigration.’” The
Department’s position is supported by New Jersey courts, which have held that immigration
status is immaterial to the enforcement of the state’s worker protections. Wage and Hour
Disclaimer,
N.J.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR
&
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/wagehour/content/wage_and_hour_disclaimer.html
(last
visited Apr. 2, 2013).
79
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workers’ compensation benefits to be more like personal injury or
contract remedies, to which all workers are entitled, and thus as distinct
from other statutory economic payments, such as back pay and
unemployment benefits. In a very pointed decision, New Jersey
Appellate Judge Sylvia Pressler opined that workers’ compensation
benefits are analytically distinct from economic payments, such as
unemployment benefits, and specifically held that undocumented
employees are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under the
84
WCA.
The unavailability of economic payments to undocumented
workers, such as unemployment compensation or back pay under the
NLRA, does not mean that workers’ compensation is also unavailable to
85
the same population. A claimant’s availability for work is a
prerequisite for eligibility for unemployment compensation, and the
Supreme Court interpreted the NLRA to essentially contain an identical
86
prerequisite. Unlawfully present aliens are not qualified for
unemployment compensation because they are prohibited by law from
87
accepting employment at all. The rationale for prohibiting access to
unemployment compensation and back pay are very similar: one cannot
have a right to payment, which turns on gaining access to work one is
not authorized to engage in. The Hoffman court held that one is not
entitled to back payments for work he was not authorized to have in the
88
first place. Similarly, one may not receive unemployment benefits
“[s]ince an illegal alien is prohibited by law from accepting a new job, .
. . [and therefore he] must be deemed unavailable for work, thus not
temporarily unemployed and therefore not qualified for unemployment
84

Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225 (holding that “the right to workers’ compensation is as
much an incident of the employment as the right to receive salary, and has been earned once
the labor has been performed.”) Accord Fernandez-Lopez, Inc. v. Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d
1051, 1053 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15–36) (finding
that, because “the term ‘employee’ is synonymous with servant”, the Act does not
specifically exclude illegal aliens from recovery for injuries suffered on the job because the
statutory definition of employee is “all natural persons . . . who perform service for an
employer for financial consideration,” and explaining that IRCA does not pre-empt state
workers’ compensation laws). Cf. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219,
229–30 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that federal law does not preempt New York state law
allowing injured undocumented workers to recover compensatory damages for lost
earnings).
85
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–4(i)(1) (West 2013).
86
§ 43:21–4(c)(1); Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144.
87
§ 43:21–4(c)(1).
88
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–52.
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89

compensation.”
Unlike the unemployment compensation system, which primarily
has a prospective focus of seeing a worker through a temporary period
of unemployment, the conceptual basis of the Workers’ Compensation
system is the substitution of the statutory remedy for a common-law
right of action, the statutory remedy becoming an integral component of
90
the contract of employment. As such, workers’ compensation inhabits
a legal landscape situated somewhere in between a statutory benefit and
a civil legal remedy. New Jersey has found workers’ compensation to
be more like a civil remedy in its role and purpose, and thus it should be
accessible even to undocumented alien workers.
Further, in New Jersey, the Workers’ Compensation system, unlike
the unemployment compensation system, is not governmentally funded.
Rather, it is primarily subsidized by employers’ insurance premiums or
91
self-insurance funds. New Jersey courts have found that public policy
is well served by causing the private sector to bear the responsibility for
payment of workers’ compensation as it encourages employers to
92
ensure workplace safety.
In Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., Judge Pressler opined
that
none of these predicates is in the least degree compromised by the
eligibility of an injured illegal alien for workers’ compensation.
Surely, the effect on the worker of his injury has nothing to do with
his citizenship or immigration status. If his capacity to work has been
diminished, that disability will continue whether his future
employment is in this country or elsewhere. Moreover, his need for
medical treatment and his right thereto as an incident of his
employment do not derive from or depend upon his immigration
status. They are, rather, a function of work he has actually performed
93
during the course of which he sustained an injury.

There are fundamental reasons, in the absence of an express
statutory bar, for according undocumented workers the benefit of the

89

Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224.
See Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 161 A.2d 479, 484 (1960).
91
See Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224 (citing Romanny v. Stanley Baldino Const. Co., 667
A.2d 349, 351 (1995)).
92
Eger v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 539 A.2d 1213, 1217 (1988); Stephenson v.
R.A. Jones & Co., 510 A.2d 1161, 1173 (N.J. 1986) (Stein, J., dissenting).
93
Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224–25.
90
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94

Workers’ Compensation laws. “‘[A] well established body of law
holds that illegal aliens have rights of access to the courts and are
eligible to sue therein to enforce contracts and redress civil wrongs such
95
as negligently inflicted personal injuries.’” Workers’ compensation
rests upon both contract and tort principles; the contract right in effect
substitutes for the tort right an employee would otherwise have.
“It would not only be illogical but it would also serve no
discernible public purpose to accord illegal aliens the right to bring
affirmative claims in tort for personal injury but to deny them the right
to pursue the substitutionary remedy for personal injuries sustained in
96
the workplace. . . .” New Jersey recognizes that, with respect to
undocumented workers, “the sui generis nature of unemployment
compensation and the considerations uniquely relevant to its
administration are not transferrable to or in any way applicable to the
97
alien’s right to prosecute personal injury claims.” Judge Pressler noted
that a rule of law denying workers’ compensation to an undocumented
worker is more likely to encourage, rather than to deter, employers to
98
employ unlawfully present aliens. Such a rule would therefore disserve
the public policy expressed by federal law.
Most importantly, the Mendoza court observed, “[s]urely, the
effect on the worker of his injury has nothing to do with his citizenship
or immigration status. If his capacity to work has been diminished, that
disability will continue whether his future employment is in this country
99
or elsewhere.”

94

Id. at 225.
Id. (quoting Montoya, 401 A.2d at 1103).
96
Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225.
97
Id. at 248.
98
Id. at 225 (“We also regard the desideratum of workplace safety enhanced by
according workers’ compensation benefits to an illegal alien since an employer’s immunity
from payment of compensation to that class of employees might well provide a disincentive
to assuring workplace safety. Moreover, such an immunity from accountability might well
have the further undesirable effect of encouraging employers to hire illegal aliens in
contravention of the provisions and policies of the Immigration Reform and Control Act.”).
99
Id. at 224.
95
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CONCLUSION
Undocumented alien workers in New Jersey are entitled to noneconomic benefits if they are injured on the job. They are not entitled to
back pay or front pay because they are not lawfully entitled to work.
Thus, providing access to workers’ compensation is not in conflict with
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the NLRA in light of the IRCA.
The Supreme Court made clear that undocumented workers are not
entitled to compensation solely for work in the United States in which
they are not authorized to engage in the first instance. However,
Workers’ Compensation in New Jersey is distinct from those facts.
While it is a statutory scheme all the same, workers’ compensation is a
legislative alternative for recovery in the courts under tort and contract
principles. One need not have work authorization in the United States to
bring those suits, and thus, in the words of Judge Pressler, it would be
“illogical” to deny access to a legislated substitute remedy. New Jersey
understands the limits of benefits to which undocumented workers have
access—there are those benefits for which work authorization is a
prerequisite and those for which it is not. One line that has been drawn
to highlight this difference is the denial of unemployment benefits for
undocumented alien workers, versus the grant of access to workers’
compensation. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Hoffman, New Jersey has held that one may not recover for lack of
access to employment in which one is not authorized to partake, but one
may utilize a statutory scheme to make one whole again where one has
been injured in the course of employment.
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APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF STATE COURT RULINGS

[Vol. 37:2
100

California
Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d
23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd., No. B150724, 2002 WL 14515 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
2002); Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.,
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Colorado
Champion Auto Body v. Indust. Claim Appeals Office of State of Colo.,
950 P.2d 671 (Colo. App. 1997).
Connecticut
Dowling v. Slotnick, 244 Conn. 781, 805 (Conn. 1998) (holding that
undocumented workers are able to pursue remedies under the
Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act).
District of Columbia
Marboah v. Ackerman, 877 A.2d 1052 (D.C. 2005).
Florida
Arreola v. Admin. Concepts, 17 So. 3d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009);
Safeharbor Emp’r Svcs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So. 2d 984 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So. 2d 1168
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d
701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Georgia
Cont’l PET Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004);
Earth First Grading v. Gutierrez, 606 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004);
Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004);
Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 479 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).

100

See generally Margaret A. Shield, Application of Workers Compensation Laws to
Illegal Aliens, 121 A.L.R. 5TH 523 (2013).
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Hawaii
Gambalan v. Kekaha Sugar Co., 39 Haw. 258 (Haw. 1952).
Illinois
Econ. Packing Co. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 901 N.E.2d 915 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008).
Kansas
Doe v. Kan. Dept. of Human Res., 90 P.3d 940 (Kan. 2004).
Louisiana
Rodriguez v. Integrity Contracting, 38 So. 3d 511 (La. Ct. App. 2010);
Artiga v. M.A. Patout & Son, 671 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
Maryland
Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882 A.2d 817 (Md. 2005).
Michigan
Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. 2003).
Minnesota
Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 2003).
Nebraska
Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 778 N.W.2d 504 (Neb. Ct. App.
2009).
Nevada
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
New Hampshire
Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2005)
(“Allowing recovery of lost wages under limited circumstances will not,
in our opinion, bar enforcement of our Immigration laws.”).
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New Jersey
Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004);
Fernandez-Lopez v. Jose Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d 1051 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1996); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
New Mexico
Gonzalez v. Performance Painting, Inc., 258 P.3d 1098 (N.M. Ct. App.
2011).
New York
Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (Hoffman did not apply to preclude an illegal alien’s claims under
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for work already
performed.); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 25 A.D.3d 14, 26
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[N]o court has held, that an undocumented
alien may be deprived of wages for work already performed.”);
Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 69 A.2d 875, 876 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979) (ruling that “the practice of hiring unlawfully present aliens,
using their services and disclaiming any obligation to pay wages
because the contracts were illegal is to be condemned”); Testa v.
Sorrento Rest., Inc., 10 A.D.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); see also
Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt., LLC, 57 A.D.3d 29, (N.Y. 2008);
Ramroop v. Flexo-Craft Printing, Inc., 896 N.E.2d 69 (N.Y. 2008);
Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Workers’ Compensation Provisions Relating to Nonresident Alien
Dependents, 28 A.L.R. 5TH 547 (1995).
North Carolina
Roset-Eredia v. F.W. Dellinger, Inc., 660 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008); Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., Inc., 559 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002); Rivera v. Trapp, 519 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
Oklahoma
Lang v. Landeros, 918 P.2d 404 (O.K. Civ. App. 1996).
Oregon
Hernandez v. SAIF Corp., 35 P.3d 1099 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
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Pennsylvania
DDP Contracting, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 826 A.2d 830
(Pa. 2003); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 570
Pa. 464, 810 A.2d 99 (Pa. 2002); Mora v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.,
845 A.2d 950 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004); Morris Painting, Inc. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 814 A.2d 879 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
South Carolina
Curiel v. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 655 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 2007).
Tennessee
Silva v. Martin Lumber Co., No. M2003-00490-WC-R3-CV, 2003 WL
22496233 (Tenn. Special Workers’ Comp. App. Panel Nov. 5, 2003).
Texas
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. 2003);
Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635
(Tex. App. 1972).
Virginia
Granados v. Windson Dev. Corp., 509 S.E.2d 290 (Va. 1999); Peterson
v. Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 872 (Va. 1981) (holding that immigration
status is “immaterial to Neme’s right to recover damages for lost
wages”); Mendoza-Garcia v. Cho Yeon HWI/Best Cleaners, No. 125700-4, 2001 WL 292316 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2001); Rios v. Ryan Inc.
Cent., 542 S.E.2d 790 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Alvarado v. Krajewski, No.
0981-00-4, 2001 WL 15827 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2001); Billy v. Lopez,
434 S.E.2d 908 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); Manis Const. Co. v. Arellano, 411
S.E.2d 233 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Wisconsin
Arteaga v. Literski, 265 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Wis. 1978) (holding that
undocumented immigrants have a right to sue in the courts of
Wisconsin).
Wyoming
Felix v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 986 P.2d 161
(Wyo. 1999).

